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Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe: From Rule of Law to Quality of
Justice. By Daniela Piana. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010. Pp. 196.
Price: $114.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Grant Bermann.
In Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe: From Rule of Law to
Quality of Justice, Daniela Piana investigates the sources of norms and values
that influence judicial behavior in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the
European Union has recently sought to institute guarantees of judicial
independence in future member states, its efforts have come into conflict with
the pre-existing judicial systems of these candidate countries. Piana examines
several questions arising from this conflict. To what extent have the European
Union's efforts been effective? Have they permanently altered the judicial
culture of future member states? If changes have occurred, can they be
adequately described in terms of judicial independence, or should one look to
other features of judicial governance? If so, which features? And how can we
reconcile these features with the principle that democratic governments ought
to be based on the rule of law? Piana's answers form a rigorous and original
contribution to the study of European law and politics. Judicial
Accountabilities in New Europe is useful to anyone interested in the judicial
functioning of an enlarged Europe.
Piana entertains three hypotheses, of varying degrees of persuasiveness,
concerning the basis of shifting judicial behavior in Eastern and Central
European countries recently admitted to the European Union. The first
hypothesis is that domestic judicial institutions, rather than supranational
influences, have been the major factor in judicial policymaking and agenda-
setting. The "soft" mechanisms of influence exerted by the European Union-
for example, socialization, monitoring, and policy transfer--do not drive
domestic institutions toward common norms and values. Rather, she argues,
domestic institutions use these external inputs as resources and opportunities
to reinforce existing domestic allocations of power. These domestic political
actors, she concludes, dominate judicial policies, regardless of the level of
external pressure exerted.
The second hypothesis is that strategic factors, rather than cultural and
historical ones, have been dominant in shaping the judicial governance of
certain Central and Eastern European countries. She explores this theory by
looking for divergent patterns of judicial reform in countries that share similar
cultural and historical backgrounds, but exhibit divergent levels of judicial
competence. Here, Piana's data, though rigorous and empirical, fall short of
proving her claim. To test her second hypothesis, she examines two sets of
states-Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary on the one hand, and
Bulgaria and Romania on the other. She notes that all five were candidates for
EU membership and therefore subject to its admittance requirements, but that
the two groups differed in their legal traditions. Whereas the first group of
Central European states shared a tradition of Austro-German constitutionalism
(defined by Piana as a strong legacy of Rechststaadt, or formal coherence as
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the main factor in the judicial interpretation of norms), the second group
shared a legal tradition akin to French constitutionalism (defined by Piana as
systems in which the legislative body representing the majority is the central
source of legitimacy). Piana finds divergent patterns of judicial reform in
states that shared the same cultural and historical background, even if they
allocated judicial competence differently. She concludes that the allocation of
judicial competences was a more important factor than cultural and historical
background in driving judicial reforms.
Piana's reasoning in this section glosses over a salient complication.
Namely, she overlooks the differing demands the European Union imposed on
the two sets of countries when they were candidates for accession. She notes
in passing that "the EU adopted a stricter and more rigid position in terms of
reforms required to reach the membership" (p. 43) for the second set of states
because it considered their records on human rights, corruption, and organized
crime inadequate-a concern which delayed the two states' accession by three
years. However, she underestimates the possible ramifications of this
omission, namely, that it obscures the possibility that different patterns of
judicial reform were due to divergent accession standards, rather than
different domestic allocations of power.
In her third hypothesis, Piana examines with greater nuance the
European Union's influence on five types of judicial accountability in New
Europe, and concludes that external inputs have had impacts of varying
degrees. Legal accountability (defined by mechanisms of appeal, judicial
review, and procedural guarantees of a fair trial), she argues, was already in
place and merely consolidated as a result of external inputs. Institutional
accountability (defined by meritocratic recruitment and promotion
mechanisms, and meaningful interaction with political representatives)
resisted foreign influence. And managerial, professional, and societal
accountabilities (measuring the capacity to deliver a sentence in a reasonable
time, ideological diversity, and external trust and transparency, respectively)
integrated supranational influences more conspicuously. Piana's contribution
in this section is particularly original and fair-minded, as it challenges the
prevailing opinion in European scholarship that socialization cannot curb the
influences of domestic institutional settings, while also resisting the tendency
to overstate socialization's power to create change.
Piana's methods are empirical and rigorous throughout. She studies an
enormous collection of primary and secondary materials from Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania between 1989 and 2007;
she also conducts fifty interviews and two original surveys. The disadvantage
of this empirical approach, however, is that her book at times resembles a
social science study more than an elaboration of a theory. Piana seems to
promise something more in her introduction-namely "a conceptual
framework, which tries to put in innovative terms the relationship that exists
between the organization of the judicial system, judicial independence and the
enforcement of the right to a fair trial in a multi-level system of governance"
(p. 7). A greater focus on theory, rather than data, would have benefited the
book.
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Perhaps the strongest section of Piana's book, captioned "Judicial
Governance as a Mirror of European Constitutionalism," (pp. 159-86) arrives
when she moves beyond the statistics and stakes out novel, broader claims.
The boldest is that the constitutional designs adopted immediately after the
breakdown of communism initiated a process of path-dependence that led to
later judicial reforms. Building on her earlier scholarship, Judicial Policies
and European Enlargement,' she argues that institutions empowered during
this pre-accession democratic transition maintained or reinforced their
positions by exploiting policy opportunities presented by the European Union.
In doing so, she challenges the existing view that it was the European Union
that exerted a powerful influence on its new member states. Although the
book is largely geared toward European legal scholars, these interdisciplinary
insights will be of great interest to scholars of European history and politics
more generally.
Piana makes a strong contribution to the literature of European law and
Central and Eastern European political history with Judicial Accountabilities
in New Europe. She investigates the sources of norms and values in New
Europe, reaching novel results that challenge existing orthodoxy. While her
book would have benefited both from a more detailed examination of the
influences of divergent EU accession standards on patterns of judicial reform
and from a more theoretical approach to her subject, her work remains a
valuable resource for those interested in the promotion of the rule of law and
judicial and legal reforms around the world.
Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions. By Michael
Newman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Pp. xiii, 218.
Price: $35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Matthew Christiansen.
In Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions, Michael
Newman examines the theoretical and historical evolution of the use of
military force to intervene in a foreign country in the name of that country's
citizens. As the title suggests, the concept is riddled with legal, political, and
ethical contradictions. Newman offers a valuable contribution to the debate
over humanitarian intervention by linking the history of intervention to the
primacy of state sovereignty within the international legal system. He
successfully demonstrates how even something as unimpeachable as a
pronouncement against genocide involves a nexus of economic development,
neocolonialism, and the role of international institutions.
Newman begins by showing how a commitment to inviolable state
sovereignty formed the foundation of the post-World War II international
legal order. Nonetheless, he argues "it would be misleading to suggest that
state-sovereignty and non-intervention were the sole features of the
international legal and normative system established in 1945" (p. 11). Instead,
the atrocities committed during the war led the United Nations to enshrine
1. Daniela Piana, Judicial Policies and European Enlargement: Building the Image of a Rule
of Law Promoter, in THE SEARCH FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY: VALUES, POLICIES AND LEGITIMACY OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 176 (Furio Cerutti & Sonia Lucarelli eds., 2008).
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basic human rights within the international system. This commitment,
however, quickly took a back seat to the realities of the Cold War and
decolonization, as the United States and the Soviet Union alternatively took
up the banner of inviolable state sovereignty to protest the other's
interventions in foreign wars. At the same time, the newly independent states
stressed the primacy of state sovereignty to prevent future interventions by
their former colonizers. Thus, Newman argues that for a period of time, most
state actors had an incentive to make inviolable sovereignty the basis of the
international system.
Nonetheless, the unrestrained violence of the Cold War demonstrated
the limits of a system based on sovereignty. Beginning with the Khmer Rouge
genocide in Cambodia and continuing through the wars in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the world witnessed mass killings and persecution
on a level unseen since World War II. Simultaneously, Newman argues, the
West became convinced that its commitment to political and economic
liberalism combined with a muscular defense of these principles was
necessary to defeat communist totalitarianism. A consensus emerged quickly
in the West that the same combination could be applied in order to defeat the
menace of genocide and other crimes against humanity. As Newman put it,
"the assumption [was] that the relationship between sovereignty and human
rights had changed so fundamentally that there was now a new acceptance of
humanitarian intervention" (p. 77). This is the first of the major contradictions
identified by Newman. How could a system based on sovereignty be
consistent with universal human rights?
The initial answer was to deemphasize sovereignty. The first Gulf War,
the British incursion in Sierra Leone, and Tanzania's intervention to unseat Idi
Amin's government in Uganda all suggested that military force could end
atrocities. Yet as Newman points out, these interventions revealed a second
contradiction: intervention in the name of humanitarianism always took place
when the intervening power had strong geopolitical interests in the relevant
country or region. Respected observers, such as M~decins Sans Fronti~res,
saw Western intervention as "a 'fig leaf theory' of international action, with
the fig leaf worn to cover up a real political strategy" (p. 97). This line of
argument gained credence when the United States and NATO used
humanitarianism to justify intervening in Somalia, Kosovo, and, belatedly, in
the 2003 war in Iraq.
The war in Kosovo revealed Newman's final pair of contradictions. To
justify intervention, the intervening powers argued that the sovereign (in this
case the former Yugoslavia) had failed to uphold its commitment to its
citizens. Yet the pre-invasion problems in countries such as Rwanda, Kosovo
and Iraq were largely a legacy of Western military and economic intervention.
Moreover, although the interventions were supposed to reduce human
suffering, Western concerns about casualties resulted in the use of
disproportionate force, such as the prolonged aerial campaign in Kosovo, and
an emphasis on leaving the country as soon as possible. This led inevitably to
massive civilian casualties and minimal attention to post-intervention stability.
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For skeptics of humanitarian intervention, it became difficult to believe that
these interventions benefited the populations at risk.
Throughout his analysis, Newman admirably weaves together case
studies on interventions and critiques by international legal scholars and
practitioners. This allows him to argue convincingly that these interventions
and the West's military and economic self-confidence created an atmosphere
in which the United States and its allies were increasingly prepared to
intervene, provided that they faced minimal casualties. Newman
simultaneously exposes the increasing global disillusionment with
humanitarian intervention as the United States and its allies seemed to co-opt
the language of humanitarianism in pursuit of their geopolitical interests.
Newman's solution is to refocus the humanitarian intervention debate on
the structural factors that produce emergencies and demand intervention. He
argues that our understanding of humanitarian intervention has become too
focused on the use of military force and invokes Amartya Sen's concept of
human security as a framework for a more holistic intervention doctrine. In
explaining his interpretation of human security, Newman focuses on political
and economic institutions that could mitigate "downside risks" to the poor
from the threats to "human survival and safety of daily life" (p. 187). These
threats include disease, famine, and other acute resource shortages that could
plunge a region into the state of disarray that often precedes humanitarian
catastrophes.
This section is the book's most innovative. Newman argues that a
holistic approach focusing on the forces that threaten human security would
address his contradictions, restoring legitimacy to the notion of humanitarian
intervention. For instance, he argues that intervention will not be seen as neo-
imperialism if the intervening power has a history of strengthening human
security within the region. Similarly, if more attention is paid to fighting
famine and other destabilizing forces, it is more likely that humanitarian
intervention will actually benefit the country than if conducted solely through
airstrikes once it reaches a state of emergency. In other words, putative
interveners are more likely to be viewed as acting in the best interests of the
population if they also focus on the structural issues leading to instability
rather than only on the noxious political figure in charge at the time.
Although Newman acknowledges that Western countries are frequently
among the first to provide various forms of aid in an emergency, he argues
that the pursuit of liberal economic policies and support for unpopular leaders
frequently contributes to the instability that demands aid. For instance, he
argues that poorly executed privatization concentrated resources in the hands
of a small group of elites in developing countries, often exacerbating ethnic
tensions and preventing governments from using them to mitigate human
suffering (pp. 112-13). In this way, Newman addresses the legitimacy deficit
facing humanitarian intervention.
Yet Newman's approach fails to explain how to evaluate humanitarian
intervention in a world that retains many of his contradictions. Following a
major recession and in the face of new challenges such as al-Qaeda and
China's ascendency, it is more difficult than ever to expect that the United
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States and other potential interveners will make human security the major
plank of their foreign policy. Newman hints at this problem in the book's last
section by discussing how to establish the authority for, and the limits of,
intervention. For instance, he suggests that many of the principles underlying
just war theory, such as proportionality, should be applied to humanitarian
intervention. These sections, however, do not address how to evaluate a
potential intervention that would have many of these contradictions, but might
still benefit the country's population.
The United Nations' peacekeeping force in Rwanda faced this situation.
The country was a former colony with a history of Western abuse and neglect.
Moreover, any intervention by Belgium, France, or the United States might
well have been portrayed as neocolonialism and involved a disproportionate
military response. Yet many people sympathetic to Newman's critique would
also agree with former President Bill Clinton when he called the failure to
intervene in Rwanda the biggest regret of his administration.
The question that eludes Newman is how to evaluate a potential
intervention that might save tens of thousands of lives, but would avoid many
of his contradictions. Arguably, this was the situation in Rwanda and Kosovo.
Newman concludes that an intervention in the former might have been
justified, but that the actual intervention in the latter was a mistake. Newman
enumerates many of the considerations that should have gone into these
decisions. However, the book fails to provide a coherent framework for
intervention that both addresses his contradictions and accounts for the
realities of the international system. Humanitarianism may still require an
intervention with contradictions in order to avoid atrocities and preserve
innocent lives.
Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement. By
Chad P. Bown. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2009.
Pp. xiv, 245. Price: $28.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Diane A. Desierto.
Why do developing countries have fewer opportunities to enforce their
rights in the international trading system, and what can be done to
meaningfully improve their self-enforcement ability? Defining self-
enforcement as "the mechanism through which [World Trade Organization
(WTO)] market access commitments are maintained across countries in the
current system" (p. 109), Chad Bown offers a strongly institutionalist response
to these questions, focusing on developing countries' underutilization of WTO
dispute settlement processes. Bown rejects the "anti-globalization" narrative
prevalent since the Doha Development Round and clarifies that the
negotiations behind various General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
agreements did not purposely neglect developing country interests (pp. 22-
44). If developing countries have not been able to profit from the international
trading system's principle of reciprocity in foreign market access, Bown
argues that it is mainly due to three factors: (1) relatively weak capacity to
undertake WTO-authorized post-litigation retaliation to induce respondent
countries to comply with WTO decisions; (2) fear of these respondents' extra-
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WTO counterretaliatory measures, such as the elimination of bilateral aid or
preferential access to developed economy markets under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) or similar programs; and (3) structural costs
endemic in the "extended litigation process" in the WTO (p. 111). Assuming
that the first two factors best belong to other ongoing dialogues on systemic
reform at the WTO, Bown focuses his policy analysis on the third. It is an
analytical divide that is difficult to maintain in assessing this book's
prescriptions, since structural cost analysis inimitably bears on the first two
features of WTO reform. Their omission weakens the feasibility of Bown's
policy recommendations.
Drawing on empirical data and anecdotal information from WTO cases
such as EC-Bananas III, Bown discusses various cost-points that developing
countries encounter within the extended litigation process (pp. 45-137). First,
he identifies pre-litigation information asymmetries between exporting firms
in developing countries. These asymmetries lead to disparate abilities among
firms in detecting less observable inconsistencies within WTO policy, such as
trade-restrictive measures that would not ordinarily be brought to public
scrutiny as a result of the WTO Agreements on Antidumping, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and Safeguards. Second, Bown explains the actual
litigation costs, as well as legal, economic, and political technical expertise,
necessary to bring developing country claims (whether in the form of original
complaints, co-complaints, or third-party participation) to successful
outcomes in the WTO dispute settlement process. Finally, he points to post-
litigation costs required to induce respondent countries to comply with WTO
decisions, such as international publicity, lobbying within respondent
countries, or WTO-authorized trade retaliation measures.
The analysis of cost-points omits the perceived effectiveness of the
WTO dispute settlement process at achieving just and qualitatively correct
legal outcomes for developing countries, whether on their closely contested
substantive points of GATT law (for example, the Article XX and XXI
exceptions, especially in the 2009 reports of the Panel and WTO Appellate
Body in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products) or on procedural
fairness issues (for example, selection of Panel members). The empirical data
on "developing country" exporting firms that initiate WTO enforcement (pp.
110-11) also do not account for possible developed country influences on
these firms, such as equity ownership, strategic commercial partnerships,
actual managerial control, or parent-subsidiary or affiliate linkages. These
omissions involve significant issues of WTO systemic reform that are
unfortunately avoided in Bown's cost analysis.
For each of the cost-points, Bown either describes mechanisms already
extant under the WTO framework, or proposes new mechanisms that
supposedly ameliorate the cost for developing countries. He devotes a chapter
to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, which acts as the primary legal
assistance institution for mitigating developing countries' actual litigation
costs (pp. 138-74), and another chapter to development-focused
nongovernmental organizations that could serve as key institutions in helping
developing countries implement post-litigation leveraging strategies (pp. 175-
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207). Finally, to aid developing countries' exporting firms in identifying
possible WTO violations-from readily apparent antidumping measures and
safeguards to latent government policies that cause illegal impairment of
foreign market access-Bown proposes a privately funded non-WTO
institution, the "Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments" (IAWC), to
function as an open-source database of all WTO violations (pp. 229-36).
Staffed by lawyers, economists, and political scientists, the IAWC would help
fill information gaps in the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism, NGO-
initiative databases such as the Global Antidumping Database and Global
Subsidies Initiative, and national governments' own trade policy databases
(such as those of the United States and Japan). IAWC would operate as an
"information clearinghouse" (p. 234) from which developing countries could
seek legal, political, and economic assessments of the estimated value of
litigating each potential violation.
By narrowly focusing on certain institutional costs that affect developing
countries' use of the extended litigation process at the WTO, Bown misses
certain factors that complicate developing states' access to foreign markets. In
trying to map how a developing state would choose its optimal level of
engagement with the WTO dispute settlement process, he ignores other cost-
endogenous and normative variables that might defy empirical measurement
but could also help explain current or future data variances. Some examples
include: the multilayered dynamics and hierarchies in developing countries'
strategic relationships and alliances at the WTO; the perceived legal quality of
WTO decisions; developing states' internal trading contexts and commercial
constituencies; and the mobilizing effects of regional clustering among
developing countries in the Group of 77, Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Mercado Comdin del Sur (Mercosur; the South American
common market regional trade association), African Union, and South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), among others. Bown
acknowledged the importance of many of these variables in his earlier work.2
Yet inexplicably, he left them out in this book.
Bown's briefly sketched proposal for the IAWC paradoxically
undermines his faith in the WTO dispute settlement process and the WTO's
nature as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations. Claiming that the
WTO's "heightened surveillance role might put into jeopardy some of the
benefits that it currently offers on other fronts" (p. 221), Bown does not
satisfactorily explain why the information-monitoring process cannot be built
into the information design within WTO framework. For instance, why would
the problems he identifies not be more easily solved through more frequent,
targeted, and expanded trade policy review at the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, or by adding a fact-finding dimension to Advisory Centre on
WTO Law's legal advising, case-building, and opinion-rendering functions? It
is unclear why a nebulously funded and unaccountable institution such as the
IAWC would be the more authoritative and appropriate body to undertake
information-monitoring for developing countries. By seeking to externalize
2. See Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L EcON. L. 861, 863-67 (2005).
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information-monitoring for developing countries' identification of foreign
market access violations away from the WTO in favor of a stylized ad hoc
nonstate institution, Bown implicitly accedes to the perceived North-South
divide within the WTO and to the political impossibility of intergovernmental
monitoring and reporting of influential governments' trade violations.
With similarly perilous implications, Bown assumes developing
countries' interests are best served through continuous involvement in the
WTO dispute settlement process. He concludes that there would be "positive
spillovers from more disputes initiated against developing countries" (p. 242),
because this would demonstrate "that exporters elsewhere found developing
country market access valuable enough that they were willing to spend some
... resources to ensure its continuance" (p. 245). His consequentialist faith in
an institution-led reduction of developing countries' costs in the WTO dispute
settlement process impoverishes his discussion of developing countries' self-
enforcement strategies to achieve foreign market access.
The underlying realpolitik tension affecting developing countries'
limited capacity for self-enforcement in the international trading system
cautions against trusting perceived achievements of legal formalism in WTO
adjudication. Even with reduced costs, the extended litigation process does not
always beget positive results for developing countries. Although minimizing
pre-litigation, litigation, and post-litigation costs could indeed incentivize
developing countries to use the extended litigation process in the WTO
dispute settlement process, litigation will not uniformly result in, or improve,
foreign market access. Bown's analysis of cost-incentives is valuable for
developing countries insofar as they consider different self-enforcement
options within the WTO. The analysis falls short when it proposes hermetic
"one-size-fits-all" solutions such as the IAWC.
Developing countries encompass differently sized markets, diverse
governments, and unique constituencies, all of which weigh in on the eventual
policy decision to trigger (or refrain from triggering) the extended litigation
process. Bown argues that more information on the costs of the extended
litigation process and the detection of losses of foreign market access would
incentivize exporting firms' legal advisers to counsel their firms to push their
respective home governments toward initiating the extended litigation
process. However, developing countries' paths to WTO litigation do not
always follow a linear trajectory triggered by exporting firms. Authoritative
decisionmakers in developing countries may sparingly resort to the extended
litigation process due to retaliatory incapacities, international alliances, and
national interests. Bown's failure to attend to such realities, which affect
countries' rational choices between litigation and informal approaches to self-
enforcement, limits the projective value of his structural cost analysis and
policy proposals.
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Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations. By
Alexander Cooley & Hendrik Spruyt. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2009. Pp. xiv, 206. Price: $24.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Sarah
El-Ghazaly.
Many international relations theorists begin from the precept that
sovereignty is exclusive and indivisible. Alexander Cooley and Hendrik
Spruyt do not. Their new book, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in
International Relations, is concerned, instead, with the divisibility of
sovereignty, that is, the processes by which states enter into hybrid
governance arrangements to share, rather than monopolize, the rights
traditionally associated with sovereignty.
A hybrid governance agreement splits sovereignty rights and allocates
partial sovereignty over a state asset, such as territory or decision-making
power, outside the host country. Such agreements take two forms. On the one
hand, states can choose to create an all-inclusive, complete contract up front.
On the other hand, they can choose to defer settling some of the agreement's
components through later negotiation. The latter option yields an incomplete
contract, which gives the residual rights holder-the state that retains all rights
aside from those ceded through the contract-bargaining leverage it can use to
renegotiate a more advantageous deal in the future. Incomplete contracting
can bring about piecemeal change in governance structures; it meets the
immediate needs of both parties while keeping open the possibility of more
profitable arrangements in the future.
Incomplete contracting allows parties to leverage their present positions
into more advantageous future positions. This, according to Cooley and
Spruyt's incomplete contracting theory, presents two significant
consequences. First, bargaining power can change and frequently shifts in the
direction of the residual rights holder. Consequently, a state that lacks
military, political, or economic clout might nevertheless be in a position to
secure a better deal even if renegotiating with a more conventionally powerful
state. The Philippines, for one, gained its independence from the United States
through a 1946 agreement that stipulated continued unrestricted U.S. control
over military installations there. Gradually, and most prominently during the
Ferdinand Marcos presidency, however, renegotiations increased both
Philippine control over those bases and the compensation payments it received
from the United States (pp. 115-20). When the Philippines gained sovereignty
over the military bases, its power was initially just symbolic. Over time,
however, the Philippines was able to use its status as a residual rights holder
to secure a more favorable agreement whenever it and the United States came
to the negotiating table anew.
Second, the potential for renegotiation calls attention to the parties'
credibility. The residual rights holder, in particular, carries the burden of
"credible commitment" insofar as the other party will (presumably) require
some form of assurance against capricious breach (p. 39). Largely because of
these two features of incomplete contracts, Cooley and Spruyt contend that the
theory of incomplete contracts, as applied to hybrid governance arrangements,
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can further understanding of why states will enter into incomplete contracts to
share sovereignty rights and which of those contracts will endure. According
to Cooley and Spruyt, neither of the two primary international relations
theories-realism and constructivism--can provide as consistent an account
for how states choose to share sovereignty. Realism encompasses the view
that powerful states, in order to advance their own interests, influence the
behavior of the weaker ones. Constructivism is the paradigm that states derive
their interests from membership in an international community. For Cooley
and Spruyt, incomplete contracting theory complicates international
bargaining in ways that neither realism's focus on power nor constructivism's
emphasis of norms and identities can.
Cooley and Spruyt do not deny that realism and constructivism hold
some explanatory power in distinguishing between shared sovereignty
arrangements of varying levels of success. However, neither can provide a
systematic explanation. Realism cannot explain how powerful states
frequently resign to the demands of conventionally powerless ones. Likewise,
constructivism cannot explain why some hybrid governance agreements
succeed and others do not when international norms remain constant.
Alternatively, Cooley and Spruyt argue that shared sovereignty agreements
emerge when states realize that such governance arrangements are feasible
and preferable to the alternatives of complete control or total relinquishment.
Neither realism nor constructivism can account, for instance, for how a state
hosting a U.S. military base is able to enhance its leverage so effectively
during negotiations of those basing agreements (p. 103). Since World War II,
the leasing contracts for these U.S. bases overseas have required renewal
every few years and have thus given host countries the opportunity both to
limit American use of the bases and to request more compensation for those
use rights. In response to an increasing loss of bargaining power, the United
States instituted a Global Defense Posture Review in 2003 that seeks to create
a "network of smaller, bare-bones bases" with the consequence that no one
base will be indispensable to U.S. operations (p. 137). Because the United
States will have the flexibility of negotiating with alternative host sites, it can
significantly limit the bargaining power of all potential host states. Cooley and
Spruyt suggest, however, that incomplete contracting theory should present
some "cautions" for the United States. Host states will likely return to harder
bargaining because military threats tend to be geographically specific, and
therefore, not all U.S. bases are equally expendable (p. 138).
Cooley and Spruyt turn to their theory of incomplete contracts to explain
the difference between NAFTA's limited scope and the European Union's
comparatively broader one. According to Cooley and Spruyt, the relevant
difference between these agreements stems from their foundational
documents. NAFTA, as a complete contract, is exclusively a free trade
agreement because the parties resolved all specifics of the contract ex ante.
Conversely, the European Union is a credit to incomplete contracting because
the parties-the member states--decided to reconcile many issues through
subsequent legislation or adjudication. To signal their credible commitment,
the stronger EU states had to yield significant control rights, which meant that
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regional institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, would play a
larger role.
Cooley and Spruyt argue that although realism and constructivism can
explain why NAFTA and the European Union materialized, neither theory can
competently describe why NAFTA resulted in less regional integration than
the European Union. That difference, the authors suggest, is penetrable only
by reference to the substance of each contract; only a theory of contractual
incompleteness can explain why NAFTA did not result in the same level of
regional integration as the European Union (p. 181). Cooley and Spruyt
propose, furthermore, that their theory holds predictive power for other
regional organizations, including ASEAN and Mercosur (p. 185).
Unfortunately, this proposition remains unelaborated, leaving the reader to
wonder about its particulars. Cooley and Spruyt offer no resources to
determine whether the members of either organization-ASEAN or
Mercosur-appear to be moving in the direction of incomplete contracting, or,
furthermore, whether doing so be to the respective members' advantage.
Likewise, while the authors intend to inform international policymakers
on flexible, durable solutions for states with competing interests, the guidance
they provide lacks sufficient precision to be of much practical help. Cooley
and Spruyt do list their propositions (p. 40) and further define them through
their case studies. But those propositions do not provide much direction, being
either too vague in general, or too tied up with a specific case study. For
instance, the reader knows that parties must show credible commitment, but
what can policymakers do to effectively demonstrate that commitment? Each
case study presented is grounded in a unique set of historical circumstances;
extrapolation from one case to another is very imperfect. Policymakers might
be able to observe patterns from Cooley and Spruyt's case studies, but the
value of applying such patterns to future cases is limited at best.
Furthermore, although the authors aim to distinguish their theory from
realism-and they are generally successful at that-the distinction is not
entirely convincing. Indeed, the notion of incomplete contracting seems to
sometimes fit comfortably within realism's bounds. In the decolonization of
Algeria, for instance, France was supposed to give Algeria independence but
retain use rights to military bases and oil reserves within its territory. Changes
in France's military needs undermined the state's incomplete contract.
Simultaneously, Algeria turned its back on the agreement when it was able to
find other economic partners. These changes in the dynamics of the French-
Algerian relationship led to the agreement's unraveling. But one imagines that
realism would have predicted the same end result. Despite Cooley and
Spruyt's language of "incomplete contracting," their reliance on variables like
relative military strength and economic benefit insinuates a disguised form of
realism.
Even so, the realist shadings do not subtract from the interest of Cooley
and Spruyt's approach to the question of hybrid sovereignty. By viewing
international governance in terms of contracts, their theory illustrates the
divisibility and exchangeability of sovereign rights. Cooley and Spruyt also
draw attention to the long-term consequences of contractual completeness and
Recent Publications
incompleteness. Although the prescriptive elements of Contracting States are
sometimes hazy, Cooley and Spruyt have compiled an impressive and
instructive list of case studies on the diversity of contracting between and
among states. Policymakers-especially those interested in making
incomplete governance contracts work proficiently-would do well to take
note.
Means to an End: The U.S. Interest in the International Criminal Court. By
Lee Feinstein & Tod Lindberg. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution Press, 2009. Pp. ix, 158. Price: $24.95 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Aline Flodr.
From open hostility to measured acquiescence, the United States has had
at best a tentative relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC)
since the court's inception on July 17, 1998. At the time of the signing of the
Rome Statute, the domestic debates on U.S. participation in the ICC turned on
a key ideological disagreement as to whether the international institution
would erode U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action in its efforts to combat
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. In their
new book, Means to an End: The U.S. Interest in the International Criminal
Court, Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg have presented a refreshingly
dispassionate, yet ultimately disappointing examination of the United States's
past relationship with the ICC as well as recommendations for the United
States's future policy toward the court. With the 2008 election of President
Obama and the currently underway 2010 ICC Review Conference concerning
the court's future direction, this reevaluation of U.S. policy toward the court
could not be more timely. After reviewing the history of the U.S. interest in
preventing war crimes and promoting accountability-along with the
evolution of its critical, even hostile, attitude toward the ICC-the authors
conclude that the United States "should end a policy of opposition or hostility
toward the court and adopt instead a policy of cooperation" (p. 8), which
should be publicly announced and concretized through a series of
recommendations supporting the court's efforts.
The authors begin their reassessment by reframing the discussion of the
U.S. relationship with the ICC in two ways: (1) broadening the framework of
the discussion to include U.S. policy toward international justice generally;
and (2) focusing the review on the foreign policy, national security and moral
interests of the United States in actively supporting the ICC. Although
Feinstein and Lindberg argue that the United States has more often than not
demonstrated a commitment to promoting international justice, human rights,
and political freedom, their inquiry into the United States's historical
commitment to these principles avoids discussing striking counterexamples
and cabins "international justice" as concerned only with war criminals. In
doing so, the authors fail to convincingly justify and support such a broad
claim.
The authors attempt to compensate for this failure by focusing on the
United States's arguably consistent track record in promoting the rule of law
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in war, particularly by describing its critical role in the creation of the
international military tribunals at Nuremberg and in Japan, as well as the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
For example, while arguing that the role of the ICC in U.S. foreign policy
should be evaluated according to the degree to which it helps bring
g~nocidaires to justice, the authors gloss over the fact that the United States
took over three years to ratify the Genocide Convention, which at least begs
the question of whether there has been a simple, unblemished commitment to
larger international justice principles. While it is clear that the authors attempt
to establish "the deeply ingrained [U.S. value and] principle of justice for all"
(p. 124), they undercut the power of their argument in taking an overly bold
position and failing to address the instances where the United States has
seemingly betrayed its "fidelity" to the core principle of international
justice-eradicating impunity for atrocities of international concern.
Despite painting a relatively flawless picture of the U.S. commitment to
international human rights and justice, Feinstein and Lindberg provide a
balanced account of the evolution of the U.S. policy toward the ICC. The
authors explain that although the United States quite certainly was a leader in
the initial theoretical discussions on the creation of a permanent international
criminal tribunal, support quickly deteriorated as negotiations toward a viable,
concrete institution progressed. The final Rome Statute contained provisions
that the United States had strongly opposed, and President Clinton signed the
Statute apprehensively only so that the United States could "remain in a
position to influence the evolution of the court" (p. 39). According to the
authors, the critiques from within the government and independent outsiders
coalesced into six main objections to the treaty: "(1) the Court's assertion of
jurisdiction over some nationals of nonparty states; (2) the prosecutor's ability
to initiate cases on his own; (3) the lack of external oversight by or
accountability to the international community; (4) deficiencies in the due
process protections afforded to defendants; (5) . . . technical problems,
including the inability of states to lodge reservations with the treaty;" and (6)
ideological concerns about U.S. sovereignty (p. 39).
Armed with these critiques, President Bush's new administration and
Congress collectively began a "diplomatic and legislative effort to discredit
and undermine the [ICC]" (p. 46), ranging from un-signing the Rome Statute
to enacting a series of anti-ICC statutes, such as the American Service
Members' Protection Act of 2002, which required suspension of military aid
to any ICC state party that did not enter into a bilateral immunity agreement
with the United States (p. 51). The authors then outline the domestic pressures
that led the Bush administration to scale back its anti-ICC policies, and
powerfully combat previous criticisms of the court not by advancing their own
ideological arguments but by allowing the positive track record of the court
and its utility in dealing with gross violations of human rights speak for itself.
Contrary to the parade of horribles raised by opponents to the ICC, the court
has in practice protected the rights of defendants, embraced its place as a
"court of last resort," rejected frivolous referrals for prosecutions, avoided
extending jurisdiction to nationals of nonparty states except at the request of
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the U.N. Security Council, and maintained a friendly relationship with the
United States. Although the court has also endured criticism and controversy,
such as being too focused on crimes in Africa, on balance, "many of the
concerns that most worried American critics have been allayed in practice, if
not put to rest" (p. 62).
Having quelled initial doubts about the ICC, Feinstein and Lindberg
promote a new chapter in U.S. relations with the ICC-an explicit policy of
cooperation. Disclaiming ideological perspectives in order to answer the
question of whether a policy of cooperation would serve U.S. interests, the
authors posit that if the United States's ultimate goal is to ensure that
perpetrators of mass atrocities are held accountable, then a policy of
cooperation will better serve that end than the alternatives of: (1) open
hostility toward the court; (2) benign neglect of the court; or (3) swift
ratification of the Rome Statute. Having previously addressed the serious
domestic and international setbacks of the United States's anti-ICC policies,
the authors next focus primarily on the comparative advantage of a policy of
cooperation relative to benign neglect and swift ratification. They contend that
a policy of cooperation would increase the court's legitimacy, while giving the
United States the flexibility to reassess its policy in response to future events,
such as the 2010 Review Conference, the advent of a new prosecutor, and
domestic political agitation for or against the court.
Feinstein and Lindberg argue that a policy of cooperation would directly
further the U.S. interest in holding perpetrators of mass atrocities accountable
and would indirectly benefit U.S. interests by restoring international faith in
the United States in light of its detainee policies. As true as their assertions
may be, the authors barely engage in a discussion of why benign neglect and
swift ratification would fail to generate similar, if not better, results. What are
the insurmountable drawbacks of supporting the court on an ad hoc basis, if in
situations where impunity is at issue, such as in Darfur, the United States
demonstrates willingness to support ICC efforts? Similarly, would ratification
of the Rome Statute not further U.S. interests, if the main metric is ensuring
that perpetrators of mass atrocities are held accountable?
Feinstein and Lindberg's inability to truly distinguish their policy from
others, save the previous U.S. policy of open hostility, leads to latent
ambiguities in their recommendations for Washington. Although the authors
claim that a way exists for the United States to actively cooperate with the
court through implementing changes, such as openly supporting the court's
investigations without ratifying the Rome Statute, the collective weight of
their recommendations would leave a thin, almost nonexistent line between
the United States and states parties to the ICC. Whether this would be a
worthy or politically tenable position remains disappointingly unanswered. In
light of their previous evidence, their recommendations would more
convincingly map onto their broader argument about the U.S. commitment to
international justice if these were steps toward the ultimate goal of
recommending to Congress that the Unites States become a party to the Rome
Statute. While the message of this book is ripe in the current foreign policy
environment, its argument leaves readers wanting.
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The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law. By Daniel Bodansky.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. xv, 271. Price: $39.95
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Aileen E. Nowlan.
From seals, to ships, to C0 2, Professor Daniel Bodansky's book The Art
and Craft of International Environmental Law examines the power of
international environmental law to address increasingly complex global
dangers, and concludes that this nascent form of law is the "'thirty-percent'
solution" and no more: a mechanism for states to achieve mutually beneficial
results without relying on supranational institutions (p. 15). Bodansky states
his assumptions and ambitions clearly and provides a detailed survey for the
uninitiated. Always the pragmatist, Bodansky offers precise choices on legal
regime design. His answer to the critiques of international environmental law,
particularly the perceived dearth of enforcement mechanisms, is bold
and timely. However, scholars hoping to resolve the theoretical underpinnings
of international environmental law will probably be disappointed.
Lest the "'thirty-percent' solution" discourage, Bodansky begins with an
optimistic history of international environmental law. He describes a flurry of
treaty-making activity after the 1992 Rio Summit, which brought together
13,000 participants from 176 states and 1400 nongovernmental groups, and
addressed such topics as desertification, pesticides, and Antarctica (p. 34). He
reminds us that the Montreal Protocol of 1987 dramatically reduced the use of
ozone-depleting substances and that multilateral agreements successfully
curbed oil pollution from tankers (p. 77). In keeping with Bodansky's
argument about the importance of intrastate action, he notes that the number
of states with national environmental agencies rose from eleven to 102 in the
decade after the Stockholm Conference in 1972, a movement Bodansky
asserts redefined "what it means to be a modem nation-state" (p. 29).
The book's most significant contributions are in the analysis of policy
choices and in the framework of "sovereignty cost" as a limit on multilateral
coordination. Although Bodansky does not trumpet his experience as a
government negotiator, he hits his stride when he lays out precise tradeoffs.
His "policy toolkit" prompts consideration of the design choices that would
need to be made as environmental law moves forward. For example, he
explains that specification standards, such as double hulls for tankers, are easy
to implement but put an end to innovation; performance standards such as
discharge quantities are hard to monitor but give actors flexibility. On a
regime level, standards are easier to negotiate, but rules "make compliance
more likely by making violations more clear-cut, with higher reputation costs"
(p. 106). Bodansky's experience is evident in his priorities; he asserts and
defends in less than a page that free-riding is not a problem, preferring to
spend his time on why states commit, the scope of treaty ambition, and the
costs and benefits of treaty participation. A reader grappling with possible
international environmental law regimes may find his framework of
"sovereignty cost" useful. "Sovereignty cost" is the degree to which the
freedom of action of a state is limited by an international agreement. It is
determined by stringency (how much the terms depart from business as usual)
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and strength (the cost of noncompliance) (pp. 161, 177). For example, a state
that commits to actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and then sees
domestic support for this reduction evaporate has less freedom to changes its
policies than one that has not made an international commitment.
"Sovereignty cost" can therefore be described as the risk of error a state
anticipates arising from an international agreement. This may be the best
justification for the "'thirty-percent' solution"; any more strength and
stringency would press up against states' reluctance to relinquish sovereign
freedom of action.
The discussion of the legal and normative power of international
environmental law is the most problematic part of the book. It will provide
ammunition for those who do not believe in the legal or normative force of
international environmental law and may be frustrating for those who want to
believe. The former may find strength in phrases such as "[i]nternational law
lacks any general enforcement mechanisms to sanction violations" (p. 100).
The latter may wish for firmer resolve to batten down the hatches against such
attacks. Bodansky notes that, in discussions of customary law, "the relative
importance of state practice and opinio juris has been a . . . source of
controversy" (p. 194) but does not arrive at an account of how valid custom is
generated.
Despite such holes, Bodansky is firmly in the camp that international
legal norms are powerful and goes to some length to defend this position. He
explains that states more often than not follow them: norms "do not merely
regulate playing . . . they create the very possibility of playing" through a
constitutive function as well as a regulatory one (p. 88). States may start to
follow a norm because the norm articulates a good idea and continue to do so
because law provides an independent reason for action-a "logic of
appropriateness" when actors "experience norms as constraints" (p. 91). In
addition, states may follow norms due to a "logic of consequences," a
strategic calculation that the incentives of compliance are greater than the
costs and risks noncompliance (p. 91). Bodansky urges us to look to what
states do rather than what they say, and perhaps by extension, look to states'
actions (which he argues are largely in compliance) rather than the lack of
enforcement mechanisms in the documents they sign on to. If states believe
actions to uphold a treaty norm are required, states are "more likely" to take
these actions (p. 102). Similarly, a non-treaty norm should be accepted as a
social fact, if "significant behavioral regularity has emerged" (p. 196). As a
final salvo to critics of international law, Bodansky points to "special
domestic procedures that must be fulfilled in order to enter into a treaty-
procedures that would seem unnecessary if international law were, in fact, a
fiction" (p. 101). After all this, Bodansky concludes that "the question 'what
is law?' . . . has lost its preeminence" (p. 107). Given that his book begins
with this very question, and that controversies continue to rage in our
conversations on international environmental law, this claim is rooted in hope
rather than reality.
If Bodansky side-steps some critiques, he faces head-on the perceived
lack of enforcement. He argues forcefully and at some length that there is
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more bite in international environmental law than it is given credit for and that
a binding agreement is not the only worthwhile goal. First, Bodansky explains
that "national reporting requirements" (p. 239) provide information that
domestic actors and international partners may use to bring political pressure,
and create significant reputational costs. Second, he challenges the skeptics
and the faithful by arguing that "non-binding agreements do not necessarily
represent a second-best outcome" (p. 156). Here Bodansky's intimate
knowledge of a variety of environmental regimes serves him well. Using the
example of the International Whaling Convention, he argues that legal
compliance is "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for behavioral or
problem-solving effectiveness" (p. 254). A high level of legal compliance
could be a sign of lack of ambition in the regime. Similarly, if whales are now
endangered due to collisions with ships, legal compliance with an anti-hunting
convention has little problem-solving effectiveness. We are left in a middle
zone: with something more than "no enforcement," aiming for something with
less strength and stringency than binding agreements. If this resolution feels
unsatisfying, it is more due to the evolving nature of international
environmental law than a lack of effort on Bodansky's part.
The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law will prompt
strong feelings throughout. If it is not the discussion of policy choices or
international legal theory, it may be the few unsupported prescriptive
recommendations sprinkled throughout the otherwise restrained chapters.
Bodansky provides grounds for optimism, such as his statement that the 1990
Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions "for about one-quarter of the
original cost estimates" (p. 80), but then pulls back the scope of his
recommendations perhaps more than is necessary. Are trade restrictions,
financial penalties, or criminal prosecutions really off the table? If a country's
decision to join an international agreement hinges on "the distribution of costs
and benefits domestically" (p. 165), whatever happened to distribution of
costs and benefits between countries? However, even as it side-steps some
questions, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law is a valuable
base from which scholar and practitioner alike can debate, disagree, and make
decisions about international environmental law.
The Justiciability of International Disputes: The Advisory Opinion on Israel's
Security Fence as a Case Study. By Solon Solomon. Nijmegen, the
Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009. Pp. 212. Price: $70.00
(Paperback). Reviewed by Jariel Rendell.
Five years after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued
its advisory opinion on the legality of Israel's West Bank barrier,3 Solon
Solomon has added The Justiciability of International Disputes to legal
shelves already filled with discussion of the opinion. Solomon argues that the
ICJ should decline to hear broad categories of cases he deems inherently
unsuited to international legal adjudication-in his terminology, cases that are
3. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
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sensu stricto nonjusticiable-including the West Bank barrier case. The ICJ,
he argues, should have left it entirely to the Israeli Supreme Court, which
heard two cases related to the barrier,4 to protect Palestinian rights. Although
Solomon's impassioned, densely written analysis tackles an important subject,
it does not succeed in introducing new material to the scholarship already
addressing international justiciability and the ICJ's barrier opinion.
Solomon initially casts his focus in The Justiciability of International
Disputes as the international adjudication of "legal issues that are non
justiciable stricto sensu [sic] and questions which, albeit legal can not [sic] be
resolved in international courts" (pp. 3-4). Yet he quickly pivots to his real
focus, the "advisory opinion on Israel's security fence" (p. 4), with only a
cursory glance at the history of the non-justiciability doctrine in the context of
ICJ disputes (pp. 64-74). Because he can offer little in the way of ICJ
precedent for his notion of sensu stricto non-justiciability, he instead turns to
national precedents: the U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of the political
question doctrine in Baker v. Carr5 and the Canadian Supreme Court's
designation of certain constitutional obligations as legally unenforceable in
Reference re Secession of Quebec.6 Canadian and U.S. courts can use these
legal principles to avoid deciding cases that turn on political rather than legal
considerations, and Solomon contends that these same principles "could have
been followed also by the International Court of Justice in the advisory
opinion on the security fence" (p. 74). But Solomon never successfully
establishes that the question posed to the ICJ in the barrier case was political
rather than legal.
One gets the sense, not only from Solomon's tone-for example, his
persistent use of the Israeli-referred term "security fence" in the face of an
ICJ opinion that used "wall" -but also from the scope of his analysis, that his
support for an aggressive ICJ non-justiciability doctrine flows from his
disagreement with the barrier decision rather than vice versa. Despite his
avowed focus on inherent non-justiciability, he dedicates more space to
already well-known arguments that the barrier case was nonjusticiable for
reasons extrinsic to the case (pp. 81-116) than to his argument that the case
was inherently nonjusticiable (pp. 116-44). Many of those arguments the ICJ
considered and rejected; Solomon fails to advance any forceful new argument
demonstrating that the ICJ erred when it did so. Especially troubling is his
decision to rehash Israel's claim that the participation of an Egyptian ICJ
4. HCJ 3239/02 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] lsrSC 38(2) 393; HCJ 2056/04
Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807.
5. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
6. [1998] S.C.R. 217.
7. International news organizations generally use the neutral term "barrier." See, e.g., BBC
News, Israel and the Palestinians: Key Terms (Nov. 23, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/newswatch/
ukfs/hi/newsid_8370000/newsid_8374000/8374013.stm ("The BBC uses the terms 'barrier', 'separation
barrier' or 'West Bank barrier' as acceptable generic descriptions to avoid the political connotations of
'security fence' (preferred by the Israeli government) or 'apartheid wall' (preferred by the
Palestinians)."). Legal scholars generally use the terms "wall" or "barrier." See Daphne Barak-Erez,
Israel: The Security Barrier-Between International Law, Constitutional Law, and Domestic Judicial
Review, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 540, 541 (2006), which uses the term "barrier," after noting that "[tihe
official term of the Israeli authorities is 'security fence' ..... Critics, however, more often refer to it as
the 'wall,' .... the term used by the United Nations General Assembly .. "
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judge, Judge Elaraby, "constituted an unacceptable appearance of bias"
(p. 99).8 Only the U.S. judge, Judge Buergenthal, agreed with Israel. 9 Every
other ICJ judge rejected the bias allegation, 0 and even Judge Buergenthal
could not agree with Solomon's radical claim that Judge Elaraby's
participation "gave the Palestinian side the advantage of having in the panel a
de facto ad hoc judge" (p. 104).
That Solomon revisits Israel's motion to remove Judge Elaraby is
especially surprising given that remediable judicial bias hardly makes a case
nonjusticiable, especially when the case is decided almost unanimously. The
ICJ voted by fourteen votes to one that Israel's construction of the West Bank
barrier was "contrary to international law."" The near unanimity of the
opinion stands in sharp contrast to a recent U.S. case tainted by allegations of
judicial impartiality: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company.'2 In that case,
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a lower court decision because of an
impermissible appearance of bias. The decisive vote in the lower court had
been cast by a judge in favor of a company whose owner spent several million
dollars in order to get the judge elected. But this did not in itself place the
justiciability-intrinsic or extrinsic--of the Caperton case in doubt. After
finding an appearance of judicial bias, the U.S. Supreme Court tasked the
lower court with rendering a new opinion in the case without the participation
of the compromised judge. Solomon, by contrast, treats Judge Elaraby's
alleged bias as a reason for every judge on the panel to refuse to hear the case.
This troubling claim is unsupported by precedent or by legal analysis. Indeed,
in the context of scholarly work on justiciability, the extended discussion of
Judge Elaraby's alleged bias is an unnecessary foray outside the realm of legal
analysis into the arena of political commentary. It also adds nothing to the
reader's understanding of the concept of inherent non-justiciability or its
application to the West Bank barrier case.
When Solomon finally moves on from well-known arguments related to
extrinsic non-justiciability to inherent non-justiciability, his arguments still
lack novelty. The crux of his argument is that in the barrier case the ICJ chose
between two competing narratives, Palestinian and Israeli, and thus caused
"serious damage to the Court's moral legitimization both in the eyes of part of
the academic world as well as the State of Israel" (p. 142). That Israel chose to
ignore the opinion dealt a blow, Solomon believes, to "the prestige of the
Court . . . [and to] the advancement of international law" (p. 142). The
probability of this outcome "should be taken into account by the judges in
their decision to render the requested opinion" (p. 142). But it is unclear how
this inherent justiciability approach would differ in practice from the extrinsic
8. Judge Elaraby had previously served as a diplomatic representative for Egypt; he also said
in a newspaper interview that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip violated
international law.
9. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Order, 2004 I.C.J. 3, 7 (Jan. 30) (Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 5 (majority opinion) (finding, by a vote of thirteen to one, that Judge Elaraby "could
not be regarded as having 'previously taken part' in the case in any capacity").
11. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201 (July 9).
12. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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non-justiciability approach. Indeed, his point seems to be precisely that
extrinsic, pragmatic considerations should guide the court's decisions. This
harkens back to his discussion of extrinsic justiciability, in which he argues
that the ICJ should have "pronounce[d] the issue as non justiciable" because
Israel refused to appear in the oral pleadings and refused to provide any
evidence to the court (p. 116). The lone dissenter in the barrier case advanced
essentially the same argument: Judge Buergenthal wrote in his dissent that the
ICJ ought to have declined to decide the case because it "did not have before
it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping claims."' 13 Thus, these arguments
are not only about primarily extrinsic considerations, but they are also as old
as the barrier case itself.
Moreover, the remaining ICJ judges had already essentially rejected
Solomon's robust inherent and extrinsic non-justiciability doctrines when they
agreed to decide the case despite Israel's refusal to provide evidence. The
ICJ's decision in the barrier case is consistent with its tradition of declining to
mute its legal voice because a state refuses to participate in its proceedings or
accept its decisions. 14 The ICJ's responsibility in the barrier case was not to
Israel or Palestine but to the U.N. General Assembly, which referred the legal
question. Thus, as Richard Falk aptly noted, Israel's decision not to participate
in the oral arguments, not to provide evidence, and not to accept the ICJ
opinion "should not be allowed to paralyze the [ICJ] in exercising its
responsibilities to assist the General Assembly."15
Given the multifaceted importance of the ICJ's barrier decision to the
international rule of law, to the Middle East peace process, and to the ICJ
itself as an institution, it is unfortunate that Solomon's analysis goes no
further than to retrace a multitude of well-trodden paths. His work is
especially disappointing because there are aspects of the ICJ barrier decision
left to critique. Rather than seeking a new lens through which to explore them,
however, Solomon pursues an essentially purpose-driven analysis that leads
him to criticize the ICJ's current justiciability doctrine for the same reasons he
criticizes the ICJ's barrier decision. The result is a text that ultimately fails to
illuminate either topic.
The Multilateralization of International Investment Law. By Stephan W.
Schill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xxxvii, 378.
$99.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Paul Slattery.
In The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Stephan W.
Schill argues that transnational investment law can and should be understood
as a coherent and multilateral subsystem of international law. Schill describes
sixty years of thwarted multilateral proposals, myriad nonprecedential arbitral
decisions, and the proliferation of over two thousand five hundred bilateral,
regional, and sectoral investment treaties. The result is delightfully persuasive.
13. Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 240 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 392 (June 27).
15. Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's Security Wall, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 46 (2005).
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Schill claims that, despite their diffuse form, bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) are substantively convergent. Moreover, nearly all BITs contain most-
favored-nation (MFN) clauses and capacious definitions of investors, two
vehicles that de facto multilateralize investment law. Finally, arbitral tribunals
increasingly construe BITs within an overarching, multilateral legal system. In
concert, these forces have generated what the United Nations, World Trade
Organization (WTO), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) could not: an international legal system "based on
uniform principles of investment protection" that "applies rather
independently of the sources and targets of foreign investment flows" (p. xiv).
The book addresses "counsels and arbitrators," "students and scholars,"
and officials in NGOs and governing bodies (p. xii). Schill believes that if
these constituencies see the latticework of BITs as a coherent, evolving, and
multilateral system, it will increasingly be one. Accordingly, Schill advances
detailed and meticulously sourced arguments. Yet the book is not a
dissertation for the initiated. Schill offers an accessible overview of
investment law, provides definitions and diagrams, and cites explanatory
sources. In sum, while the book will engage experienced practitioners, it could
also introduce international investment law to a classroom.
Schill's descriptive and normative projects for the book are intertwined.
He posits that international investment law is de facto multilateral and
encourages readers to embrace this structure. His arguments are convincing.
Schill adeptly toggles between theory and primary source quotations, and
places the explosion of BITs within a compelling historical narrative. In fact,
Schill's chronicle of how diffuse bargaining achieved multilateral outcomes
where express agreements faltered is itself a highlight of the book.
Schill begins with historical attempts at multilateral investment treaties.
He argues that early treaties were doomed by both North-South capital
disparities and East-West conflicts over private property and sovereignty. His
core example is the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property, which was open to non-OECD signatories. The draft
entitled foreign investors to fair and equitable treatment, most constant
protection and security, protection against direct and indirect expropriation,
and investor-state dispute settlement (p. 36). Developing and socialist
countries rejected the proposal. The only success of the period was the 1965
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), which provided for consensual
arbitration enforced by all signatories.
More recent attempts at multilateral investment treaties have also
floundered, but Schill argues that they have failed despite a shared desire for
investment protections. The 1998 OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, which differed only marginally from existing BITs, collapsed due
to controversial industry exceptions, the exclusion of non-OECD countries
from negotiations, and campaigns by environmental and labor NGOs.
Negotiations resumed within the WTO, but stalled due to developing
countries' concern with "the lack of sustainable and comprehensive
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development perspective in international trade relations" (p. 60), rather than
opposition to investment protections.
Schill's best evidence of the consensual desire for investment
protections is the explosion of BITs and their regional analogs. By 1989, only
386 existed, but by 2006, 2500 were in force (p. 41). Nearly all BITs mimic
the 1967 OECD Draft and add nondiscrimination, national treatment, MFN,
and capital transfer clauses. Schill denies that these agreements represent
developed-country bargaining power, arguing instead that they reflect a
common desire for investment protections. First, the BITs do not reflect
preferential treatment but are instead uniform and reciprocal agreements.
Second, South-South BITs generally correspond to the OECD draft and to
North-South BITs.
Still, the proliferation of convergent BITs does not necessarily add up to
a system of international law. Differences in treaty language persist, and ad
hoc interpretation could create fragmentation. Schill argues that four
additional forces weave BITs into a de facto multilateral system.
First, BITs overwhelmingly include expansive MFN clauses. These
clauses effectively incorporate the strongest investor protections found in any
of a state's BITs into all of its BITs. Schill explores arbitral disagreements
over applying MFN clauses to controversial areas like tribunal jurisdiction,
but "the use of MFN clauses to import more favorable conditions from third-
country BITs is largely uncontested" (p. 140). As MFN clauses incorporate
only benefits, and not obligations, from third-party BITs, they unify states'
obligations to all investors at maximum protection.
Second, BITs define investors broadly, permitting corporate structuring
to capitalize on favorable BITs. Generally, shareholders in state A who invest
in a company in state C through an intermediary in state B can take advantage
of any BITs between A and C and between B and C. More importantly,
countries rarely know the nationality of all direct and indirect shareholders in
a domestic company. As a result, countries honor their strongest BIT
commitments, benefiting all local and foreign investors. In short, the global
labyrinth of corporate ownership extends BITs' coverage to scores of
otherwise unprotected investors.
Third, the ICSID Convention, combined with the consent to arbitration
in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
provided by many BITs, creates a legal rather than diplomatic enforcement
framework. The Convention gives the investor a direct right of action, limits
the influence of interested states, and provides multilateral enforcement.
Arbitral tribunals, ICSID and otherwise, thus serve a legal norm-generating
function and "increasingly displace States as the primary rule makers in
international [investment] law" (p. 268).
Finally, arbitral tribunals increasingly understand BITs within a
multilateral system of investment law. First, tribunals often rely on other BITs
penned by the parties (or even third parties) to construe a BIT. Second,
tribunals use functional interpretation to "level differences in the wording of
BITs as long as the wording does not clearly mandate a departure from the
commonly adopted approach to investment protection" (p. 314). Third, a de
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facto system of precedent has emerged as tribunals rely on other tribunals'
decisions to combat the "extreme terminological vagueness" of BITs (p. 332).
Consequently, arbitral tribunals are now active agents in the
multilateralization and development of international investment law.
Despite its scope, Schill's book barely considers the incentives for
leaders of developing nations to prefer bilateral negotiating frameworks. If, as
Schill argues, the principles of investment protection are now uncontroversial,
the bilateral impulse of investment law deserves exploration. In fact, there
may still be strong diplomatic and domestic political incentives for
developing-nation leaders to prefer a bilateral framework to multilateral
negotiations or domestic policy change.
First, the relatively rapid, party-to-party negotiating process of a BIT
offers immediate diplomatic and political benefits to participating countries
and leaders. A leader looking to improve a relationship or gain political
capital with a neighbor or powerful developed country could benefit from
penning a BIT. The BIT could provide leverage in other negotiations or
simply smooth over a rocky relationship. Agreeing to a BIT could serve as a
negotiating chip when courting a specific multinational corporation
considering investing in a country. A leader seeking to appear active in the
face of an economic crisis may also gain press coverage by finalizing a
standard BIT. Whatever the motivation, successive BITs can respond to
diplomatic or political contingencies in ways that multilateral negotiation
cannot.
Second, committing to a BIT may be easier than changing domestic
policy. The treaty process may be more centralized than the domestic political
process. Regardless, BITs provide rule of law protection for foreign investors
without difficult changes to domestic institutions. Moreover, BITs offer a
commitment mechanism against domestic political turmoil that could disfavor
foreign investors. BITs may be selectively concluded with politically palatable
partners without appearing to benefit foreign corporations that serve as
condensation symbols for populist angst. While those unpopular corporations
may establish shell intermediaries in the partner country and gain the BIT's
protection, it is not likely to make the headlines.
Third, committing to a BIT may be easier than committing to a
multilateral agreement. WTO negotiations, as noted by Schill, serve as a stage
for developing countries to air general grievances with trade policy. This
phenomenon is driven in part by domestic political preferences, and bucking
the trend may prove a poor electoral strategy. Moreover, multilateral
negotiations may not be well-timed for election cycles or domestic public
sentiment.
BITs offer developing-country leaders access to FDI incentives and
diplomatic gains without evoking politically unpopular countries,
corporations, or multinational organizations. These incentives may explain the
persistence of bilateral negotiations in the face of apparent agreement on the
principles of investment protection. If de facto multilateralization does persist,
Schill suggests that the difficulty will be maintaining the legitimacy of
arbitration panels while they displace states as rulemakers. Regardless of a
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reader's position on this political challenge, Schill's book is worth a read for
the coherent form it gives to literally thousands of seemingly disparate
investment treaties.

